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FSB TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVES
Starting in the summer of 2007, the world experienced financial market turmoil that grew 
into a global financial crisis, and challenging international market conditions have persisted 
in its aftermath. Over this period, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) (and, up to April 2009 
its predecessor, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)), has been called upon by the leaders 
of the G20 countries to analyze the causes of the international market turmoil and to agree 
coordinated financial reforms that address core problems and lay the foundations to 
strengthen market and institutional resilience and promote financial stability.1 As part of 
this work, G20 leaders asked the FSF to conduct an analysis of procyclicality in the 
financial system and recommend policy options to mitigate it. Efforts to enhance 
transparency have been an important part of coordinated financial reforms, including 
through convergence activities of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
and the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 
This article summarizes the key financial stability initiatives of the FSB that seek to enhance 
transparency and move toward improved global accounting and auditing standards and 
practices. 
The FSB and its predecessor FSF recognized the importance of promoting transparency 
by encouraging high quality international accounting and auditing standards and practices, 
and improved disclosure practices. These enhance the quality of information available to 
investors and other market participants, regulators and prudential authorities, which can 
help to improve market discipline, reinforce sound risk management practices and improve 
the consistency of capital measures and ratios. External audits performed in accordance 
with high quality auditing standards can promote appropriate implementation of accounting 
standards by firms and help to enhance market confidence by providing assurance that 
the financial statements are presently fairly in accordance with the relevant accounting 
framework. Moreover, through interaction with firms’ governance and management 
processes, sound audits can help reinforce strong corporate governance and internal 
controls at firms and, in certain cases, more reliable supervisory reports. Together with 
effective supervision and other factors, the above can help to foster safe and sound 
banking systems and more stable financial markets. 
The IASB Chairman has long been a member of the FSF and FSB, serving on both the FSB 
Plenary – its policy making body – and its Steering Committee. Also, the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) of the IASB and the International Standards on 
Auditing of the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) are among 
the key standards for sound financial systems designated by the FSB as deserving of 
priority implementation, because of their importance for financial stability.2
1  Prior to the 
financial crisis
1  The FSB was established in April 2009 to coordinate at the international level the work of national financial 
authorities and international standard setting bodies and to develop and promote the implementation of effective 
regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies in the interest of financial stability. It brings together 
national authorities responsible for financial stability in 24 countries and jurisdictions, international financial 
institutions, sector-specific international groupings of regulators and supervisors, and committees of central 
bank experts. The FSB is chaired by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada. Its Secretariat is located in 
Basel, Switzerland, and hosted by the Bank for International Settlements. For further information on the FSB, 
visit the FSB website, www.financialstabilityboard.org.
2  See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/key_standards.htm.
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In the years preceding the financial crisis, the FSF carefully considered the IASB’s 
progress in developing and improving its main standards affecting financial institutions, 
as well as important accounting and auditing developments and issues arising in its 
member jurisdictions. 
– The FSF called for the establishment of the Public Interest Oversight Board to 
provide independent oversight to the international audit standard-setting 
activities of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), and was a 
strong supporter of the Monitoring Group that worked with IFAC in the 
development of reforms of its standard-setting activities in 2003. The FSB 
continues this work as a member of the Monitoring Group.
– The FSF also encouraged the establishment of independent auditor oversight 
regimes and promoted cooperation among audit oversight authorities (also 
called audit regulators). The FSF strongly supported the formation of the 
International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR), recognizing the 
role it could have in enhancing communication and coordination among 
audit regulators and bringing more consistency to global audit regulation 
over time. 
– Moreover, the FSF conducted joint international roundtables in 2004 and 
2006 together with the IASB and IFAC on ways to improve international 
accounting and auditing practices. 
In addition, the FSF maintained dialogue with leading global financial institutions and audit 
firms on important international accounting, auditing and disclosure issues affecting 
financial markets such as valuation, impairment, off-balance sheet entities and related risk 
management and control practices.
In October 2007, the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors asked the FSF to 
undertake an analysis of the causes and weaknesses that produced the market turmoil 
and to set out recommendations for increasing the resilience of markets and institutions, and 
to report to their meeting in Washington in April 2008. 
The findings and recommendations in the FSF’s report in April 2008 were the product of 
an intensive collaborative effort of the main international bodies and national authorities 
in key financial centers. To address the G7 request, the FSF formed a senior working 
group from among its membership. They drew on a large body of coordinated work, 
comprising that of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS), the Joint Forum, the IASB, the Committee on Payment and Settlement 
Systems (CPSS), the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and national authorities 
in key financial centers. In addition, insights had been gained from private sector market 
participants.
To restore confidence in the soundness of markets and institutions and enhance the resilience 
of the global financial system, the FSF proposed concrete actions in the following five areas:
2  Initial 
recommendations 
in early 2008 as 
the market turmoil 
deepens3 
3  “Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience”, April 2008. See 
www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0804.pdf. 
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– Strengthened prudential oversight of capital, liquidity and risk management;
– Enhancing transparency and valuation;
– Changes in the role and uses of credit ratings;
– Strengthening the authorities’ responsiveness to risks; and
– Robust arrangements for dealing with stress in the financial system.
In order to enhance transparency and valuation, the FSF report encouraged a number of 
actions, including needed risk disclosure, valuation and accounting convergence reforms. 
In assessing challenging situations during the market turmoil, the FSF found that: 
– Weaknesses in public disclosures by financial institutions had damaged 
market confidence. Public disclosures that were required of financial 
institutions did not always make clear the type and magnitude of risks 
associated with their on- and off-balance sheet exposures. There were also 
shortcomings in the other types of information firms provided about market 
and credit risk exposures, particularly as these related to structured products. 
Where information was disclosed, it was often not done in an easily accessible 
or usable way.
– The turbulence revealed the potential for adverse interactions between high 
leverage, market liquidity, valuation losses and financial institutions’ capital. 
For example, write-downs of assets for which markets were thin or buyers 
were lacking raised questions about the adequacy of capital buffers, leading 
to asset sales, deleveraging and further pressure on asset prices. Poor 
information availability reinforced these adverse feedback loops.
The market turmoil highlighted the importance to market confidence of reliable valuations 
and useful disclosures of the risks associated with structured credit products and off-
balance sheet entities. To address these particular issues, the FSF report called for specific 
actions by market participants, standard-setters, supervisors and regulators relating to:
– Risk disclosures by market participants;
– Accounting and disclosure for off-balance sheet entities;
– Valuation; and 
– Transparency in securitization processes and markets
These recommendations are summarized in Box 1.
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Robust risk disclosures:
– The FSF strongly encouraged financial institutions to make 
robust risk disclosures using leading disclosure practices 
(summarized in the FSF report), at the time of their mid-year 
2008 reports.
– The private sector should jointly develop principles for 
relevant risk disclosures and identify leading risk 
disclosure practices based on current market conditions 
and risk at the time of the disclosure.
– Further guidance to strengthen disclosure requirements under 
Pillar 3 of Basel II was issued by the BCBS in 2009.
Standards for off-balance sheet vehicles and valuations:
Relevant standard setting bodies took urgent action to:
– Improve and converge financial reporting standards for off-
balance sheet vehicles;
– Develop accounting, supervisory and auditing guidance on 
valuations when markets are no longer active, including calling for 
the establishment of an IASB expert advisory panel on valuations.
Transparency in structured products:
– Market participants and securities regulators took steps to 
expand the information provided about securitized products 
and their underlying assets.
BOX 1OVERVIEW OF FSF-RECOMMENDED INITIATIVES IN 2008 TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND VALUATIONS
The FSF’s first recommendation strongly encouraged financial institutions to make robust 
risk disclosures using leading disclosure practices at the time of their upcoming mid-year 
2008 reports. These leading-practice risk disclosures were summarized in the FSF report 
and based on a survey by the Senior Supervisors Group (SSG) of end-2007 risk disclosures 
for selected exposures that the marketplace considered to be high-risk or involve more 
risk than previously thought.4, 5 Specifically, the FSF recommended robust, consistent 
disclosures about the following types of exposures:
– Collateralized debt obligations, including related hedges;
– Other subprime and Alt-A exposures;
– Special purpose entities (SPEs); 
– Commercial mortgage-backed securities; and
– Leveraged finance exposures.
The report stressed that these disclosures should be made by financial institutions for 
significant risk exposures. FSB communicated the FSF recommendations to financial 
institutions in their jurisdictions and encouraged enhanced disclosure practices for those 
with significant exposures. In response to the recommendations by the FSF and others, 
Improved risk disclosure 
and valuation by market 
participants
4  Senior representatives of eight supervisory authorities from five countries (collectively the “Senior Supervisors 
Group” or SSG) joined in issuing a report to the FSF that reviewed the disclosure practices of financial services 
firms concerning their exposures to certain financial instruments that the marketplace in early 2008 considered 
to be high-risk. The SSG analyzed year-end 2007 disclosures by a sample of large internationally-oriented banks 
and securities firms, in its report to the FSF, Leading-Practice Disclosures for Selected Exposures, April 2008.
5  The term “leading” was used by the FSF and SSG to mean most informative, both as regards quantity and quality 
of information (e.g., the data would enable market participants to assess the risks and returns of investments in 
or exposures to the firm; so that market participants can properly understand data that are disclosed). The 
proposed disclosures were intended to supplement rather than replace existing risk disclosures, including those 
required under Pillar 3 of Basel II. The FSF noted that, in this context, disclosure broadly included not only 
information presented in public securities filings but also information presented in earnings press releases and 
accompanying presentation slides posted to the firms’ internet websites.
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many large banks started to provide more meaningful and consistent quantitative and 
qualitative information about structured credit risk exposures, valuations, off-balance 
sheet entities and related policies from mid-2008.6 
A second set of principles-based recommendations included in the FSF report encouraged 
investors, financial industry and auditors to work together to provide principles and leading 
practice risk disclosures that would be most relevant to market conditions at the time of 
disclosure. This would help keep disclosures fresh and reflective of the risks truly being 
faced at those future reporting dates, and avoid institutions focusing undue attention on 
making supplemental disclosures focusing on yesterday’s risk issues that are no longer 
relevant to the marketplace. 
Third, the FSF report called on financial institutions to establish rigorous valuation 
processes and make robust valuation disclosures. To this end, they should:
– Establish rigorous and timely processes to apply critical expert judgment and 
discipline in how they value holdings of complex or illiquid instruments 
(avoiding undue reliance on ratings and consensus pricing services);
– Maintain sound governance and control practices associated with valuation 
processes, including those that deal with hard-to-observe inputs to valuation 
models, model validations, price verification and related audit programs; and
– Enhance the quality of their disclosures about valuations, valuation 
methodologies, price verification processes and the uncertainty associated 
with valuations.
The FSF’s work spurred additional measures by banking supervisors to enhance transpar-
ency. The BCBS issued in 2009 further guidance to strengthen disclosure requirements 
under Pillar 3 of Basel II, for example, for securitization exposures, off-balance sheet entities, 
liquidity commitments to asset-backed commercial paper conduits and valuations. 
Also, the BCBS issued supervisory guidance for assessing banks’ financial instrument fair 
value practices in April 2009. The principles in this supervisory guidance promote strong 
governance over valuation processes; the use of reliable, diverse information sources for 
valuation inputs; the communication of valuation uncertainty to internal and external 
stakeholders; independent verification and validation processes; consistency in valuation 
practices for risk management and reporting purposes, where possible; and strong 
supervisory review of bank valuation practices.
Accounting and auditing standard-setters also took forward the FSF’s initiatives. In 
response to the FSF’s recommendations to enhance transparency and valuation, the IASB 
implemented a number of key projects. Given the importance of these initiatives, these 
projects were undertaken on an accelerated timetable.7 
BCBS initiatives requested 
by the FSF
Initiatives by accounting and 
auditing standard setters
6  The FSB Thematic Review on Risk Disclosure Practices, March 2011, found that this has improved risk disclosure 
practices related to structured credit activities, including exposures to SPEs, asset-backed securities, 
mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations. See http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/
publications/r_110318.pdf. 
7  At the time of the development of the FSF report, the IASB due process requirements resulted in significant time 
to propose and finalize standards and the IASB did not have procedures for accelerating projects. Such 
procedures were later approved by the trustees overseeing the IASB, now called the IFRS Foundation.
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– In October 2008 the IASB enhanced its guidance on valuing financial 
instruments when markets are no longer active, based on the findings of an 
expert advisory group on valuation that it had established in June 2008.8 The 
IASB also issued proposals to strengthen disclosures about valuations and 
related governance, controls, methodologies and uncertainties. 
– Moreover, as mentioned in the FSF recommendations, the IASB developed 
proposals to enhance its standards on consolidation of off-balance sheet 
entities and related risk disclosures and finalized these proposals during 
2009 to 2011.
Furthermore, the FSF report indicated that the IAASB, major national standard setters and 
relevant regulators should enhance the guidance for audits of valuations of complex or 
illiquid financial products and related disclosures, where necessary. The report 
recommended that the largest global audit firms provide input to this process by sharing 
their audit approaches in addressing auditing and financial reporting issues resulting from 
the market turmoil and which could be used for enhancing auditing guidance. The IAASB 
issued a Staff Audit Practice Alert in October 2008 on audits of valuations and complex 
products and also discussed these issues with the largest international audit firm networks 
to encourage improved practices.9
The FSF report also called for the IASB and the US FASB to converge their standards and 
guidance in key areas. In addition, as discussed below, the calls from the marketplace for 
convergence strengthened as the financial crisis deepened.
In addition to recommendations in the reports of the FSF and FSB, the FSB supported 
dialogue to foster better understanding and communication with respect to important 
international accounting, auditing and risk disclosure issues, including the following:
Senior official dialogue:
– The FSB Chairman, Secretary General and senior advisor maintained dialogue 
with the Chairmen of the IASB, U.S. FASB and IAASB on key developments 
in projects of interest to the FSB.
– The FSB supported the IASB in maintaining enhanced technical dialogue with 
senior representatives of its member bodies and with the accounting 
committees of IOSCO, the BCBS and IAIS.
– The FSB conducted roundtables and other focused meetings to foster 
dialogue between senior officials in the private and public sectors on 
important accounting, auditing, and risk disclosure developments and 
issues.
8  This IASB guidance was issued in the following report: www.ifrs.org/NR/rdonlyres/0E37D59C-1C74-4D61-A984-
8FAC61915010/0/IASB_Expert_Advisory_Panel_October_2008.pdf. 
9  Following, in part, from the FSF recommendation to the IAASB and other audit authorities, in 2009 and 2010 the 
IAASB proposed improvements in its audit guidance for complex financial instruments that draws attention to 
relevant aspects of accounting for fair value measurement and related disclosures and practical considerations 
when auditing such instruments. The IAASB finalized this as IAPN 1000.
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Technical dialogue:
– The FSB senior advisor participated in (a) the IASB-FASB Financial Crisis 
Advisory Group; (b) the IASB Expert Advisory Panel on Valuations and (c) the 
IASB Expert Advisory Panel on Impairment.
– The FSB Secretariat maintained ongoing technical dialogue with the IASB and 
FASB project experts on key aspects of their convergence progress.
In its April 2008 Report, the FSF noted that it would examine the forces that contribute to 
procyclicality in the financial system and develop options for mitigating it. At the G20 
Leaders Summit in London in April 2009, the FSF issued a report, “Addressing Procyclicality 
in the Financial System”.10 
The term “procyclicality” refers to the dynamic interactions between the financial and the 
real sectors of the economy. These mutually reinforcing interactions tend to amplify 
business cycle fluctuations and cause or exacerbate financial instability. The global 
financial crisis was a graphic example of the disruptive effects of procyclicality. Institutions 
that experienced extensive losses faced growing difficulties in replenishing capital. This, in 
turn, induced them to cut credit extension and dispose of assets. Their retrenchment 
precipitated a weakening of economic activity, thereby raising the risk of a further 
deterioration in their financial strength. Addressing procyclicality in the financial system is 
an essential component of strengthening the macroprudential orientation of regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks. 
The FSF report examined the forces that contribute to procyclicality in the financial system, 
and explored possible mitigating actions in three main areas: (i) the Basel II capital accord; 
(ii) loan loss provisioning; and (iii) valuation and leverage, including margining practices. 
The recommendations in the report were the result of collaborative work involving national 
authorities, the BCBS, BIS, CGFS, IMF, IOSCO, the IASB and the U.S. FASB. 
At the London summit meeting, the FSF was re-established as the FSB with a broadened 
mandate to promote financial stability. The G20 Leaders welcomed the accounting 
recommendations in the FSF’s procyclicality report and requested action by account-
ing standard-setters.11 The G20 Leaders also called on “the accounting standard setters 
to work urgently with supervisors and regulators to improve standards on valuation and 
provisioning and achieve a single set of high-quality global accounting standards”.12 
Specifically, the G20 Leaders encouraged accelerated efforts by the IASB and FASB to 
finalize improved, converged accounting standards and efforts to enhance the governance 
of the IASB. 
The G20 Leaders requested that the FSB monitor implementation efforts, including those 
addressing accounting issues. Starting with its progress reports to the G20 Leaders in 
September 2009, the FSB has included recommendations on accounting matters in its 
communications with the G20, including an assessment of IASB-FASB convergence progress. 
Box 2 provides an example of FSB recommendations on impairment and valuation presented 
in its progress report to the G20 Leaders at the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009.
3  The G20 Leaders and 
FSB on procyclicality, 
convergence and 
transparency
10  See www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904a.pdf.
11  G20 Leaders, “Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System – London Summit, 2 April 2009”.
12  G20 Leaders, “London Summit – Leaders’ Statement, 2 April 2009”.
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31. Moreover, continuing differences in accounting requirements 
of the IASB and FASB for netting/offsetting of assets and liabilities 
also result in significant differences in banks’ total assets, posing 
problems for framing an international leverage ratio.
32. Therefore, additional work in the areas above is urgently 
needed in order to meet the important objectives of convergence, 
transparency and the mitigation of procyclicality, as standard 
setters continue their efforts to improve the quality of their 
standards and reduce the complexity of their standards on 
financial instruments.
33. We strongly encourage the IASB and FASB to agree on 
improved converged standards that will:
– incorporate a broader range of available credit information 
than existing provisioning requirements, so as to recognize 
credit losses in loan portfolios at an earlier stage as part of an 
effort to mitigate procyclicality. We are particularly supportive 
of continued work on impairment standards based on an 
expected loss model; and 
– simplify and improve the accounting principles for financial 
instruments and their valuation. We are particularly supportive 
of continued work in a manner that does not expand the use of 
fair value in relation to the lending activities (involving loans and 
investments in debt instruments) of financial intermediaries.
34. While respecting the independence of accounting standard 
setters, the FSB is urging renewed efforts by the IASB and FASB 
to achieve these objectives, working with supervisors, regulators 
and other constituents. The Basel Committee has issued for 
consideration by accounting standard setters principles for the 
revision of accounting standards for financial instruments, agreed 
by all G20 banking supervisors, that address issues related to 
provisioning, fair value measurement and related disclosures.
35. We welcome the IASB’s recent initiatives with respect to 
provisioning and its enhanced technical dialogue with prudential 
supervisors and other stakeholders, and encourage the IASB to 
continue its dialogue with stakeholders as it moves forward. We 
request G20 Leaders to support the call for action set forth in this 
section.
BOX 2EXAMPLE OF FSB ACCOUNTING RECOMMENDATIONS IN PROGRESS REPORT TO G20 LEADERS, SEPTEMBER 2009
The call of the G20 Leaders to the IASB and FASB to enhance accounting for loan loss 
“impairment” or “provisioning”, was largely encouraged by FSF/FSB work at that time. 
Under both IASB standards (called International Financial Reporting Standards or IFRS) 
and FASB standards (called generally accepted accounting principles or GAAP), the 
accounting model for recognizing credit losses is commonly referred to as an “incurred 
loss model” because the timing and measurement of losses is based on estimating losses 
that have been incurred as of the balance sheet date. Provisioning requirements in IASB 
and FASB standards thus generally limit provisioning to losses that are considered 
probable as of the balance sheet date. In addition, these accounting standards do not 
permit credit losses based on events that are expected to occur in the future to be 
included in provisions until the event or events that would probably result in a loss have 
occurred, generally supported by observable evidence (e.g., borrower loss of employment, 
decrease in collateral values).
While the incurred loss model had been ingrained in the thinking of standard-setters for 
many years, the experience of the financial crisis highlighted problems, particularly with 
the delayed recognition of credit losses caused by the incurred loss standards. These 
delays resulted in the recognition of credit losses that were widely regarded as “too 
little, too late”.
New thinking was needed, based on lessons from the financial crisis, to reform the 
accounting approach in this area in a manner that would support the overall goal of 
improving transparency. The FSF Working Group on Provisioning, co-chaired by Kathleen 
Casey, Chairman of IOSCO’s Technical Committee and SEC Commissioner, and by John 
Dugan, Chairman, Joint Forum, and US Comptroller of the Currency, brought together 
securities regulators, banking supervisors, accounting standard-setters and audit 
regulators to evaluate this key area. Both U.S. and international accounting perspectives 
Encouragement to consider 
expected loss provisioning
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were carefully explored. The IASB and FASB were fully involved, as were BCBS 
representatives and the chairmen of IFIAR and the U.S. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board. The working group also engaged in outreach involving investors, external 
auditors and financial institutions. This effort helped to ensure that the group’s findings 
would address needs of investors while also addressing certain key prudential objectives.
In April 2009, based on the working group’s recommendations, the FSF’s procyclicality 
report to the G20 noted that: “Earlier recognition of loan losses could have dampened 
cyclical moves in the current crisis... Earlier identification of credit losses is consistent both 
with financial statement users’ needs for transparency regarding changes in credit trends 
and with prudential objectives of safety and soundness.” The FSF report recommended: 
“The FASB and IASB should reconsider the incurred loss model by analyzing alternative 
approaches for recognizing and measuring loan losses that incorporate a broader range of 
available credit information.” 
In its progress report to the G20 Leaders in September 2009, the FSB noted that, “We are 
particularly supportive of continued work on impairment standards based on an expected 
loss model”. 13
This encouragement has led to valuable work by the accounting standard setters. The 
IASB proposed an expected loss impairment or provisioning model in November 2009. 
The FASB, after first proposing in May 2010 a modified version of the incurred loss model, 
has been working jointly with the IASB since early 2011 on clarifying and finalizing an 
expected loss impairment approach. 
As previously mentioned, the FSF procyclicality report in April 2009 had also involved an 
assessment of valuation and leverage issues. The report found that:
“The extensive use of fair value accounting encouraged market practices that 
contributed to excessive risk-taking or risk-shedding activity in response to 
observed changes in asset prices. In the course of the present crisis, this mechanism 
became clear at times of adverse market dynamics, particularly as liquidity in 
financial markets evaporated. When the markets for many credit risk exposures 
became illiquid over 2007-08, credit spreads widened substantially as liquidity 
premia grew. Wider spreads drove down mark-to-market valuations on a range of 
assets. Some fair valued assets that became illiquid were marked down to match 
declines in traded derivative indices.
The extensive use of fair value accounting meant that, across the financial system, 
these declines in valuations translated into lower earnings or accumulated 
unrealised losses in the equity account for securities held for sale. Mark-to-market 
losses eroded banks’ core capital, causing balance sheet leverage to rise. Banks 
sold assets in an attempt to offset this rise in balance sheet leverage and to 
address liquidity issues, but such sales only pushed credit spreads wider, causing 
more mark-to-market losses.”
This effort resulted in two sets of accounting recommendations, summarized below, which 
were developed with input from the IASB, IOSCO, the SEC, and the BCBS.
Encouragement to further 
improve financial instruments 
and valuation standards
13  “Improving Financial Regulation, Report of the Financial Stability Board to G20 Leaders”, September 2009.
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– Accounting standard setters and prudential supervisors should examine the 
use of valuation reserves or [valuation] adjustments for fair valued financial 
instruments when data or modeling needed to support their valuation is weak.14
– Accounting standard setters and prudential supervisors should examine 
possible changes to relevant standards to dampen adverse dynamics 
potentially associated with fair value accounting. Possible ways to reduce this 
potential impact include the following:
– Enhancing the accounting model so that the use of fair value accounting 
is carefully examined for financial instruments of credit intermediaries. 
– Transfers between financial asset categories.
– Simplifying hedge accounting requirements.
In its progress report to the G20 Leaders at the Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009, the 
FSB noted that it was particularly supportive of standards that would not expand the use of 
fair value in relation to the lending activities of financial intermediaries. Considering the 
views of stakeholders, the IASB issued IFRS 9, “Financial Instruments”, in November 2009 
which includes an amortized cost category for financial assets such as loans and certain 
investments in debt securities. The other aspects of the above recommendations have been 
reflected by the IASB in IFRS 9 and IFRS 13, “Fair Value Measurement”, as well as in the 
IASB’s planned new hedge accounting standard, which seeks to simplify hedge accounting 
requirements in ways that are more consistent with companies’ risk management practices. 
In early 2010 it looked as though divergent accounting standards for lending activities 
might arise, due to a FASB proposal to use fair value measurement on the balance sheet 
and through “other comprehensive income” for loans and investments in debt securities. 
Under this proposal, changes in fair values of lending instruments would affect reported 
shareholders’ equity, but generally would not be included in profit and loss. However, in 
response to FASB’s request for feedback from interested parties on the proposal, and 
based upon extensive outreach by the FASB, the majority of investors and other 
stakeholders indicated they did not agree with the fair value measurement recognition 
aspects of that proposal as it relates to lending activities, deposits, and other liabilities. 
The FASB has since moved away from this proposal, and has decided in its revised 
approach to use amortized cost as a measurement basis for loans.
Starting in 2009 the FSB has been reporting to the G20 Leaders on progress in implementing 
the recommendations of the G20 and the FSB, including those on accounting matters. 
Progress has been achieved so far in many of these areas. For example: 
– Measurement of loans. As discussed above, both the IASB and the FASB 
have decided that their financial instruments accounting standards will use 
amortized cost as a measurement basis for loans, moving away from an 
earlier FASB proposal to require fair value measurement for loans.
FSB monitoring of IASB-FASB 
convergence progress
14  The report noted that, “Standard setters and supervisors should explore whether firms should be required to 
hold valuation reserves or to otherwise adjust valuations to avoid overstatement of income when significant 
uncertainty about valuation exists. For financial instruments that are not actively traded, insufficient market 
depth or reliance on valuation models using unobservable inputs that are difficult to verify may create 
considerable valuation uncertainty.”
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– Loan provisioning/impairment. Following the above recommendations of the 
FSB, both Boards are seeking to develop and finalize an expected loss 
approach for impairment that should lead to more robust, forward-looking 
impairment practices that are intended to result in an earlier recognition of 
credit losses based on consideration of all available information about credit 
quality and trends.
– Off-balance sheet entities. The FSB has encouraged improved IASB accounting 
and disclosure standards for off-balance sheet vehicles. The IASB’s final 
disclosure standards in 2011 enhance information about risk exposures that 
remain when a financial asset has been derecognized (e.g. securitized), including 
improved information about unconsolidated structured entities, and are broadly 
aligned to FASB disclosure requirements.15 
– Addressing valuation uncertainty in fair value measurement guidance. The 
FSB recommended that standard setters and supervisors explore whether 
firms should be required to hold valuation reserves or to otherwise adjust 
valuations to avoid overstatement of income when significant uncertainty 
about valuation exists. Final improved IASB and FASB fair value measurement 
standards in 2011 have aligned requirements about how to measure fair 
value, including guidance on measurement when markets become less active, 
and to address valuation uncertainty. 
– Repurchase agreements. The FSB had expressed concern that the IASB’s 
consultation proposal on derecognition would require repurchase agreements 
to be treated as sales and forward contracts in certain situations (thus leading to 
off-balance-sheet treatment), instead of as financing transactions on the 
balance sheet as under current IFRS. The IASB decided not to move forward 
with its proposal. The FASB has also taken steps to review its accounting for 
repurchase agreements and plans steps in 2012 that could further converge 
its approaches with those of the IASB, for example, by eliminating “repo-to-
maturity” accounting approaches under FASB standards which result in off-
balance sheet treatment for those transactions.16
– Risk disclosures. As a result of the efforts of the two Boards, improved risk 
disclosure requirements are in place. However, not all are converged at this time.
While progress has been made toward improved, converged standards, the convergence 
process is taking longer than initially expected in some areas, such as classification, 
measurement and provisioning, and it appears that the Boards are diverging with respect 
to their ongoing projects on hedge accounting. The FSB has encouraged the Boards to 
redouble their efforts to seek converged standards in these important areas.
15  In their joint update report on convergence progress to the the FSB and G20 in April 2012, the IASB and FASB said, 
“The boards have completed their respective consolidation projects, which included addressing issues about the 
consolidation of special purpose entities and enhanced disclosures about off balance sheet risks. The new IFRS 
requirements will also bring into force new disclosure requirements relating to structured entities (special purpose 
entities), making IFRS and US GAAP disclosure requirements similar. Differences remain, however, in relation to 
what US GAAP refers to as voting interest entities; US GAAP has a legalistic approach to defining control, whereas 
the new IFRS has a broader definition of control, including effective control. On the basis of feedback received, the 
FASB also decided to expose the principal-agent sections of the IFRS model.” This joint report can be found on 
the FSB website. See www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120420d.pdf.
16  For a summary explanation of the accounting treatment for repo-to-maturity transactions and concerns about 
their use at MF Global, see www.cnbc.com/id/45132384/The_Trade_That_Killed_MF_Global,
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The netting/offsetting of derivative contracts and other financial assets and financial 
liabilities is another area where the FSB has expressed concerns. In this case, where 
different approaches result in significant differences in the total assets of large financial 
institutions, the Boards decided to maintain their different current offsetting accounting 
rules while issuing at end-2011 new requirements for common disclosures about gross 
and net positions for derivatives and other financial instruments to improve transparency. 
This follows the Boards’ issuance of a joint proposal in January 2011 on a converged 
accounting approach to balance-sheet netting. However, instead of the 2011 proposal, 
comments from the U.S. generally supported the current FASB netting rules and those 
using IFRS generally supported current IASB rules, with many investors seeking both 
gross and net information. Derivatives dealer banks, both inside and outside the U.S., 
generally wanted the FASB (net) accounting approach in order to avoid the massive 
grossing-up of their balance sheets.
The FSB noted a concern in this area was that differences in offsetting/netting accounting 
standards would adversely affect the efforts to develop an internationally comparable 
leverage ratio for capital purposes. However, while the IASB and FASB have decided to 
maintain their different accounting rules for netting/offsetting, the FASB netting approach 
and the netting approach that will be carried forward to the Basel III international leverage 
ratio are similar in their effect because both recognize netting/offsetting based on legally 
enforceable master netting agreements. Thus, from a bank supervisory perspective, there 
may be more convergence for leverage ratio purposes than is first apparent.
Some were concerned that the IASB and FASB have revised their target completion dates 
for their remaining convergence projects so that they extend into 2013, beyond the end-
2011 date called for earlier by the G20. The FSB reported to the G20 in April 2012 that the 
IASB and FASB will conduct further public consultations in the second half of 2012, and 
expect to issue final converged standards in a number of key areas by mid-2013. The two 
Boards mentioned that they have extended certain project target completion dates in order 
to allow sufficient time for outreach and public comment on the large number of planned 
major Exposure Drafts, and for the Boards to reflect that feedback in high-quality final 
standards. The FSB reported to the G20 that it supports the efforts of the IASB and FASB 
to achieve convergence to a globally accepted set of high-quality accounting standards 
and urges them to issue final converged standards on key projects by mid-2013.17
In March 2012, the FSB issued a public statement underscoring the importance of work to 
improve external audits by: 
– enhancing the information provided to prudential supervisors and regulators 
of financial institutions, and 
– reinforcing the effectiveness of the regulation of external audits, particularly 
those of financial institutions. 
The financial crisis demonstrated the importance of addressing these issues. Work to 
improve audit practices and standards is ongoing, with some regulators and auditing 
4  Improving the 
contribution of external 
audits to financial 
stability18
17  FSB Chairman’s letter, “To G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Progress of Financial Regulatory 
Reforms”, 16 April 2012. See www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120420a.pdf. 
18  See press release at www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_120315.pdf.
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standard setters having issued finalized guidance on certain audit issues, and proposals in 
some other jurisdictions having been issued subject to public consultation. In view of the 
global nature of markets, financial institutions and audit firms, greater international 
consistency in external audit practices and requirements will be important while continuing 
to promote their high quality. 
In particular, the FSB encouraged further work in the following areas:
1 Improving the information that external audits provide to prudential supervisors 
and regulators of financial institutions, including systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs). As part of this effort, the FSB will provide input to 
the BCBS’ ongoing revision of its external audit policy papers and as it 
develops new robust external audit guidance, to be proposed by end-2012, 
and to the IAIS as it updates and enhances its policies with respect to external 
audits of insurance companies. 
2 Reinforcing the effectiveness of audit regulation, particularly for external 
audits of financial institutions, to improve audit quality. The FSB is requesting 
IFIAR to report on (i) challenges and problems that its members have 
identified in their inspection programs relating to external audits of financial 
institutions, including audits of SIFIs; (ii) responses by IFIAR members to 
those issues, including follow-up with external audit firms; and (iii) member 
recommendations concerning steps that could be taken by audit regulators 
and auditors to further strengthen external audits of financial institutions. 
IFIAR decided at its Plenary meeting in April 2012 that it will seek to provide 
the report requested by the FSB by end-2012.
The FSB also announced that it recognizes the importance of other work underway to 
improve audit practices and standards and:
– encourages the continued efforts of the IAASB, internationally, and other audit 
standard setters in their national contexts to improve the standards on 
information that external audits provide to investors and other financial report 
users. The approaches set forth in various consultative documents differ 
across jurisdictions, and it will be important to seek high quality standards 
that enhance audit practices, and to the extent possible, improved international 
consistency. IOSCO has agreed to monitor developments in this area and 
provide updates to the FSB on progress. 
– asks IOSCO to report to the FSB on authorities’ experiences with the 
considerations in IOSCO’s 2008 report on audit contingency planning. 
– asks FSB members and other key bodies such as the IAASB, to provide input 
to the World Bank’s review of how to enhance its Accounting and Auditing 
Reports on Standards and Codes (ROSCs). 
The FSB will continue to support dialogue between audit standards setters and regulators, 
investors, market regulators, prudential authorities, financial institutions and audit firms on 
improving the quality of external audit and its contribution to financial stability.
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As previously mentioned, the importance to market confidence of useful disclosure by 
financial institutions of their risk exposures and risk management practices has been 
underscored in recent years. Building on the March 2011 FSB thematic peer review report 
and a roundtable held in December 2011, the FSB has undertaken an initiative to further 
enhance risk disclosure practices. 
The FSB is following up on a recommendation in the FSB thematic review report, by 
considering on an ongoing basis whether there is a need for improved disclosures about 
new risk areas as these are identified. During 2012 the FSB will deepen these assessments, 
and will continue to draw on relevant expertise from the private sector in doing so. Efforts 
involving international standard setting bodies and joint private sector initiatives will in 
many cases be the most appropriate manner to take any new risk disclosure 
recommendations forward. The report recommended that the FSB should coordinate as 
necessary the alignment of the activities of standard setting bodies to fill any gaps arising 
because of a lack of a timely response or from financial stability concerns. 
In December 2011, the FSB hosted a roundtable on risk disclosures by financial 
institutions.19 Eighty-two senior officials and other experts from around the world took 
part, representing investors and analysts, asset managers, credit rating agencies, banks, 
insurance companies, audit firms, audit regulators, accounting and auditing standard 
setters, as well as prudential and market authorities. The roundtable fostered a rich and 
lively dialogue about the current state of risks and related disclosures and how to 
improve their transparency. The key themes that arose during the course of the discussion 
are summarized below:
– Risk disclosure foundations. Participants generally preferred risk disclosure 
requirements in accounting standards and securities regulatory requirements 
that are principles-based rather than rules-based, but investors also called for 
measures to improve comparability, such as more consistent risk disclosure 
formats or templates. Principles-based approaches, such as those in the 
IASB’s IFRS 7 (on financial instrument disclosure) and the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission’s guidance on management’s discussion and analysis 
(MD&A), may be sufficient to underpin disclosure improvements of the type 
discussed at the roundtable without the issuance of new disclosure 
requirements, but greater attention needs to be paid to address user needs 
for information about emerging risks. 
– Views of regulators and accounting standard setters. The IASB and FASB 
discussed their initiatives in recent years to enhance risk disclosures. These 
include IASB improvements in standards for disclosures about financial 
instrument risks and valuations, and about off-balance sheet exposures, and 
FASB enhancements in standards for disclosures about credit risk, valuations 
and off-balance sheet risks. The two Boards have issued converged standards 
for improved disclosures about the gross and net exposures associated with 
derivatives and certain other financial instruments. 
 Regulators generally acknowledged some recent improvements in risk 
disclosure practices but they shared the view that further improvement would 
be useful to enhance transparency. Securities regulators noted the benefits of 
5  Recent FSB efforts 
to further enhance risk 
disclosure practices
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enhanced risk disclosures are 
needed as new risk areas are 
identified
Summary of key themes that 
arose during the FSB 
roundtable on risk disclosure
19  See press release and roundtable summary at www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_120320.pdf. 
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regulators and firms reaching out to key stakeholders about disclosure issues 
and the importance of monitoring information discussed during senior 
management calls with analysts and the related presentations, which could 
provide insights into ways to improve financial report disclosures. They noted, 
however, that this required significant resources. The Financial Policy 
Committee of the Bank of England has encouraged improvements in the 
quality of disclosures as indicated the Bank’s Financial Stability Reports in 
June and December 2011. 
– The role of auditors in risk disclosures. External auditors are currently required 
to consider the risk of material misstatement of the financial statements in 
planning and performing the audit. Where the applicable accounting framework 
requires disclosure in the financial statements of information relating to risk, 
the auditor is required to audit that disclosure. The auditor’s responsibility for 
disclosures in documents accompanying the financial statements – such as 
those in MD&A or the financial review section of financial reports – is generally 
limited to considering whether it is materially inconsistent with the audited 
financial statements or a material misstatement of fact. Auditors’ roles are 
also limited with respect to disclosures in interim financial reports. Generally, 
other risk disclosures, such as those in presentations to investors and analysts 
or on a firm’s websites, are not subject to external auditor’s review. 
 Audit regulators and standard setters summarized their recent guidance 
which included (i) alerts to auditors for assessing and responding to the risk 
of material financial statement misstatement in this difficult economic 
environment and (ii) consultative documents to explore possible improvements 
in auditor reporting and/or changes in the role of the external auditor for 
disclosures outside the financial statements (e.g., risk disclosures in MD&A). 
They are considering ways of expanding the scope of risk-related reporting 
responsibilities through consultative documents issued in 2011 and further 
work planned for 2012. Challenges remain in areas such as auditability of 
forward-looking statements, application of materiality concepts, and going 
concern assessments. 
Investors and analysts stressed that disclosure that enhances the transparency of risks and 
risk management practices helps to build confidence in the firm’s management, which can 
be particularly important to attract debt and equity investors. However, they argued that still 
many financial firms provide only minimal risk disclosures or obscure important information 
in voluminous disclosures that are not relevant or prioritized. Many participants encouraged 
that disclosure on past risks no longer of key importance should be allowed to be phased 
out, to ensure more relevant disclosure and avoid unnecessary reporting burden. 
Enhancements discussed. Given the current financial market environment, participants 
expressed the view that enhanced qualitative and quantitative disclosure is particularly 
important in the following areas: 
– Information on governance and risk management strategies. Investors requested 
better qualitative disclosures about governance, risk management oversight 
and related controls, and qualitative and quantitative disclosures about risk 
management practices, risk exposures and remuneration. Banking and 
insurance representatives noted the relevance of information about a financial 
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institution’s risk appetite and that risk disclosures would be most relevant if they 
were consistent with information used internally for risk management purposes. 
Disclosure should be put in the context of the financial institution’s business 
model to facilitate market understanding of risk management practices. 
– Summary disclosure and benefits of achieving comparability. Participants 
agreed that risk disclosure should be timely, clear, prioritized, consistent 
and comparable, as highlighted by a recent survey of financial report users. 
Many analysts recommended more use of executive summaries of the key 
risk categories, which should include key metrics on entity-wide risk 
exposure and risk management effectiveness. Disclosures should better 
differentiate market risk components (e.g., interest rate, foreign currency 
and commodity risk as separate disclosure categories) and firms should 
avoid voluminous or boilerplate disclosures presented as a compliance 
exercise. Some supported the idea of standardized common disclosure 
templates to facilitate comparability across firms and jurisdictions and to 
aid aggregation and assessment of system-wide risks. Others pointed out 
that risk disclosure should be supported by qualitative information that 
provides management’s context for measurements and important firm-
specific considerations. 
– Credit risk. While acknowledging that some banks have enhanced their 
disclosures in recent interim reports, participants encouraged improved 
disclosure about exposures to sovereign debt and to other financial institutions. 
In addition to the areas for potential enhanced credit risk disclosure raised in 
the FSB Report, including the disclosure of renegotiated loans for troubled 
borrowers, participants discussed other areas where enhanced risk disclosure 
could be useful, such as: (i) expected credit losses for impaired financial 
assets, (ii) counterparty exposures, (iii) derivatives, (iv) off-balance sheet and 
joint venture structures, and (v) risk concentrations. 
– Liquidity risk. Participants noted the importance of transparency about liquidity 
and funding risks, including potentially additional disclosures about sensitivity 
analyses, sources and volume of liquidity buffers, and maturity tables including 
contingent lending commitments. Given the increasing role of collateral, 
participants shared the view that the degree of asset encumbrance should be 
disclosed at a reasonable interim frequency as well as annually. Some 
mentioned the importance of addressing the liquidity of collateral and the 
extent of its use and residual availability.
– Capital adequacy and risk weighted assets (RWAs). Participants said that 
disclosures on capital planning (including the ability of firms to transfer capital 
across borders) were important. Further disclosure about RWAs and their 
calculation methods would be helpful. Investors noted as a positive 
development that some banks had started to disclose their regulatory leverage 
ratios voluntarily.
– Pillar 3 disclosure. Participants indicated that the usefulness of Pillar 3 disclosures 
was hampered by difficulties in reconciling the unaudited Pillar 3 information 
to the audited financial statements of firms. Participants generally supported 
more integrated presentation which would, for example, better link and 
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allow navigation between the Pillar 3 and financial report (e.g., IFRS 7) risk 
disclosures, align the timing of their publication, and achieve more comparability 
across jurisdictions and banks. In addition, some noted as important that 
liquidity information was included in the Pillar 3 framework, as set forth in the 
Basel Committee’s current plans.
– Scenario and sensitivity analyses. Some participants expressed their desire 
that the results of stress tests should be disclosed in financial reports, possibly 
with an indication as to whether the results are reviewed by external auditors. 
Care should be taken to properly interpret stress test results and summaries 
information in a manner useful to investors (e.g., using the impacts on earnings 
and capital of a certain change in interest rates, providing relevant information 
about non-linearity). 
The roundtable showed the value of robust exchanges on shortcomings in disclosures 
among a wide range of private sector and public sector stakeholders. The full range of 
participants agreed that it would be important for investors, financial institutions and 
auditors to develop principles and formats for better risk disclosures going forward, with 
input from standard setters and regulators, as recommended in the FSB Report. 
Participants noted that these principles and leading practice disclosures should be broad 
in scope to avoid disclosure arbitrage among various market participants. 
However, some felt that the private sector would not initially be able to carry forward this 
work on its own. Some called for more proactive involvement of the official sector under 
the current stressed situations where voluntary risk disclosure initiated by some in the 
private sector alone might not be sufficient to restore confidence quickly. Many expressed 
the view that the FSB should continue to help encourage and facilitate this work, perhaps 
by conducting another roundtable in 2012 and prompting a task force of investors, 
analysts, rating agencies, financial institutions, and auditors, with input from standard 
setters and regulators, to take forward this work.
Taking account of the views expressed at the December 2011 FSB roundtable and the 
recommendations set forth in a March 2011 FSB report on risk disclosures, the FSB 
announced in March 2012 the following next steps:
– The FSB will facilitate the formation of a task force to develop principles for 
improved disclosures based on current market conditions and risks, including 
ways to enhance the comparability of disclosures. The task force will involve 
investors, financial institutions, and external auditors and will be requested to 
develop proposed principles later this year for implementation in connection 
with end-year 2012 annual reports. The task force is expected to commence 
its activities in May 2012.
– The task force will be encouraged to have dialogue with standard-setting 
bodies, such as IOSCO, BCBS, IAIS, the IASB, the U.S. FASB and the IAASB, 
at key stages as it develops its recommendations and to report to the FSB. 
– The FSB will also ask the task force to identify leading practice risk disclosures 
presented in annual reports for end-year 2011 based on broad risk areas such 
as those identified in the summary of the roundtable. The task force would be 
asked to report on these leading practice disclosures to the FSB in 2012.
FSB next steps in its risk 
disclosure initiative
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– The FSB will consider holding another international roundtable in late 2012 to 
facilitate further discussion by investors, financial institutions, auditors, 
standard setters, regulators and supervisors on market conditions and risks 
at that time and the progress toward improving the transparency of risks and 
risk management through relevant disclosures.
As the March 2011 FSB report noted, should the follow-up actions by the private sector 
not result in sufficient progress in this area, the appropriate international standard-setting 
bodies will be asked to take forward work to consider principles. 
In May 2012, the FSB announced that the new private sector task force – called the 
Enhanced Disclosure Task Force – has been established and the FSB public statement 
provided information about the co-chairs and other members of the task force. Mark 
Carney, Chairman, FSB, welcomed the formation of the Enhanced Disclosure Task Force. 
He added “The FSB supports these efforts which, together with the activities of standard 
setters, are expected to result in improved risk disclosure practices by financial institutions 
that will provide timely and useful information to investors.”20
The FSB and its predecessor, the FSF, have encouraged improvements in the transparency 
of financial institutions and this article has summarized key initiatives in this respect, with 
a focus on those since 2008. These include calls for actions by market participants, 
standards setters, supervisors and regulators in a number of broad areas; namely:
– Convergence to improved standards by the IASB and FASB;
– Risk disclosure by market participants starting in 2008 about structured credit 
products, subprime exposures and SPEs;
– Off-balance sheet entities;
– Valuation; 
– Transparency in securitization processes and markets;
– Enhanced external audit practices; and
– A joint private sector initiative to improve risk disclosure practices. 
There has been a good deal of progress toward improved standards and practices. The FSB’s 
thematic review of risk disclosure practices found that risk disclosure by financial institutions 
had improved following the FSF’s 2008 recommendations. In addition, the IASB and FASB are 
making progress on projects to improve and converge their standards on financial instruments, 
including a joint expected loss impairment/provisioning approach and a more converged 
approach to classification and measurement. Important improvements to their standards on 
financial instruments, valuation, and off-balance sheet entities were finalised in 2011. 
The more recent initiatives on external audit and joint private sector work on better risk 
disclosure principles and practices are aimed at further enhancements in practices 
beginning within the next year.
6  Conclusion
20  The FSB press release can be seen at www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr_120510.pdf. 
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Enhanced dialogue between regulators, standard setters and industry is very important. The 
FSB encourages such dialogue in a manner that respects the independence of the standard 
setting bodies. This dialogue with key stakeholders and respect for the independence of 
standard setters are critically important in achieving improved global standards and their 
sound, high quality implementation across jurisdictions and the financial services industry. 
The FSB will continue to encourage improved standards and practices and monitor 
progress as part of its initiatives to enhance transparency.
